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Abstract
The United States is serving as a laboratory to resolve the tension between globalization, rising
transnational criminality, and the demand for enhanced human rights. This Essay reviews selected
areas of evidence gathering and extradition in transnational crime and closely related areas. The
perspective will focus particularly on the rights of defendants.
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INTRODUCTION
Contemporary transnational crime takes advantage of
globalization, trade liberalization, and exploding new technolo-
gies to perpetrate diverse crimes and to move money, goods,
services, and people instantaneously. Diverse transnational
groups, especially organized crimes groups, live and operate in a
world without borders. Increasingly, transnational criminal
groups are diversifying their crimes, markets, and networks. The
intelligence networks of the transnational criminal groups and
the coincidence of economic and political power enables them
to transfer parts of their operations and enterprises quickly to
the territories that they can dominate.' While the U.S. govern-
ment has determined that transnational organized crime is a na-
tional security threat and has taken various initiatives to combat
it,2 the U.S. government is continuously and actively seeking
more significant policy and legal initiatives to conceptualize and
establish effective regimes. Some policymakers believe that
many more transformations in the U.S. legal system are required
to combat transnational organized crime.'
The U.S. government has enacted a substantial amount of
new legislation and developed initiatives to combat transnational
organized crime.4 In particular, the United States has taken sig-
* Partner, Berliner, Corcoran, and Rowe.
1. See, e.g., Peter A. Lupsha, Transnational Organized Crime Versus the Nation-State, 2
TRANSNAT'L ORG. CRIME 21-48 (1996).
2. See Interview with the Hon. Richard A. Clarke, Special Assistant to the President and
Senior Director, Global Issues and Multinational Affairs, National Security Counci Nov. 30,
1995, 1 TRENas IN ORG. CRIME 5-9 (1996).
3. See, e.g., SENATORJOHN KERRY, THE NEv WAR: THE WEB OF CRIME THAT THREAT-
ENS AmrERIcA's SEcuRT 31 (1997).
4. On October 22, 1995, President Clinton used the occasion of his 14 minute
speech before the 50th anniversary of the United Nations to announce a number of
new initiatives against transnational organized crime, including the extension of eco-
nomic sanctions against certain Colombian narcotics trafficking organizations. See Re-
marks of President Clinton to the United Nations on the Occasion of the 50th Anniversary of the
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nificant measures against drug trafficking, anti-money launder-
ing, transnational corruption, trafficking in human beings, inter-
national terrorism, intellectual property, and fiscal offenses.5
The United States has also been in the forefront of asset forfei-
ture, especially civil and administrative forfeiture. At times, the
United States has prioritized confiscating the proceeds of crime
and disrupting organized criminal groups rather than bringing
persons to justice.
The United States has been an international pioneer at
posting liaison enforcement officers overseas, helping transform
legal regimes, and developing bilateral law enforcement working
groups on transnational organized crime (e.g., with Italy and
Mexico). The United States has provided a substantial amount
of technical and financial assistance to create training centers
(e.g., the International Law Enforcement Academy in Budapest).
Additionally, the United States has provided administration of
justice directly against transnational organized crime (e.g., in
Central and Eastern Europe). 6
At times, some law enforcement officials have cut legal cor-
ners in order to achieve their objectives. In some cases, the U.S.
judiciary has afforded leeway to those officials. Clearly, this di-
verse and large nation is serving as a laboratory to resolve the
tension between globalization, rising transnational criminality,
and the demand for enhanced human rights.
This Essay will review selected areas of evidence gathering
and extradition in transnational crime and closely related areas.
The perspective will focus particularly on the rights of defend-
ants.
I. EVDENCE GATHERING
In an era of globalization, free trade, and exploding trans-
Creation of the United Nations, FED. NEWS SERVICE, Oct. 22, 1995, available in LEXIS, Nexis
Library, Curnws File. For the economic sanctions, see Exec. Order No. 12,978, 60 Fed.
Reg. 54,579 (1995); for the text of President Directive 42 on transnational crime, see
White House, Presidential Directive on International Organized Crime, Summary Sheet, Oct.
22, 1995.
5. For activities of the U.S. Executive, see Bruce Zagaris, Clinton Administration
Prepares International Organized Crime Initiativ 12 INT'L ENFORcEMENT L. REP. 196-97
(1996); for activities of Congress, see U.S. Congress Considers Suggestions on Combatting
International Organized Crime, 12 INT'L ENFORCEMENT L. REP. 116 (1996).
6. Frank Gregory, Transnational Crime and Law Enforcement Cooperation: Problems and
Processes Between East and West in Europe, 4 TRANSNAT'L ORG. CRiME 105-33 (1995).
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national crime, law enforcement agencies have become more
proactive and eclectic in their evidence gathering. While law en-
forcement agencies investigating transnational crime assume
their targets are organized crime groups and well-heeled crooks,
frequently indigent persons are caught in the net. Increasingly,
these indigent persons find it impossible to obtain due process
in complex litigation spanning several countries, cultures, inter-
national conventions, and a mix of criminal, administrative, and
civil cases.
A. Informal Police Cooperation
A phenomenon of globalization is that police cooperation
has assumed various new forms, which could evolve into supra-
national police forces. One of these new forms of cooperation is
the use of new communication channels, such as liaison officers,
mixed investigation teams, and institutions like Europol and the
European Fraud Prosecutor ("OLAF"). New investigative activi-
ties include multiple forms of proactive policing, such as under-
cover sting operations, controlled deliveries, and flipping de-
fendants. New technological devices are used to engage in cross-
border observations by satellite and tapping electronic or tele-
phonic conversations. As police cooperation more becomes the
norm, it becomes increasingly important to formalize such coop-
eration through international conventions and restrict informal
police cooperation that violates constitutions, international
human rights law, and fundamental rights of persons.'
On September 11, 1999, during its sixteenth Congress, the
International Penal Law Association ("Association") called atten-
tion to these issues. The Association passed a resolution recom-
mending that international proactive police should abide by the
principles of legality, proportionality, and subsidiarity. The As-
sociation recommended that these principles be incorporated in
the proposed U.N. Convention against Transnational Organized
Crime on the international use of special investigative tech-
niques.8 The Association also recommended appropriate moni-
7. International Penal Law Association Adopts Resolutions on Transnational Organized
Crime, 15 INT'L ENFoRcEMENT L. REP. 502 (1999).
8. See Revised draft United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized
Crime, U.N. GAOR, Ad Hoc Committee on the Elaboration against Transnational Or-
ganized Crime, 55th Sess., art. 15, at 25, U.N. Doc. A/AC.254/4/Rev. 1 (1999), also
available in United Nations Crime and Justice Information Network (visited Apr. 19,
14052000]
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toring of such policing activities by the authorities in charge of
criminal investigations at the national level. In the case of coer-
cive or intrusive methods, the Association recommended the
provision of judicial order or review. These same principles
should apply to other international conventions and to national
laws and policies on transnational policing.
Another issue arises from the establishment of new struc-
tural forms of cooperation such as joint investigation by multiple
agencies and undercover agents in multiple countries and com-
mon automated systems (e.g., Schengen information systems).
These new forms of cooperation are required in an era of global-
ization, but they should be accomplished in accordance with the
law and with proper procedures, safeguards, and monitoring.9
An alternative way to gather evidence for defendants can be to
resort to the Freedom of Information Act.' ° On occasion, the
media, U.S. Congress, and international human rights groups
can assist in helping resolve cases.
In an interconnected world, U.S. citizens increasingly find
themselves detained abroad and charged with crimes. While re-
marking on the case ofJoseph Stanley Faulder, a Canadian who
faced execution last year on death row in Texas, Secretary of
State Madeleine Albright pointed out that there are 12,500 U.S.
citizens in foreign jails, including some 300 Texans.
By focusing on recent cases of U.S. citizens detained for
crimes in the Americas, I will highlight recurring themes in
terms of the problems that befall U.S. citizens, the legal and non-
legal means available to try to extricate them from their predica-
ment, and consider some urgent policy trends and needs for the
future architecture of the inter-American system. The four cases
upon which I will focus involved six U.S. citizens: two tourists,
one U.S. government employee, two businessmen, and one mis-
sionary.
1. Jim and Penny Fletcher, Sailing Enthusiasts from
West Virginia
The first case concerns Jim and Penny Fletcher, who hail
2000) <http://www.ifs.univie.ac.at/unjin/mosaic/dcatoc/2session/4rle.pdf> (on file
with the Fordham International Law Journal).
9. Id.
10. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1994).
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from Huntington, West Virginia. In October 1996, they were de-
tained in Bequia, in the Grenadines, St. Vincent, and charged
with the murder of Jerome Joseph, a water taxi driver. Eventu-
ally, their case went to trial. The court dismissed all charges and
finally released them in August 1997.11
When the Fletcher family first retained me, almost seven
weeks after their detention, they already had an attorney from
Puerto Rico, his associate, who had criminal defense experience,
and two very seasoned St. Vincentian defense counsels, one of
whom was also the opposition leader. There had been quiet ne-
gotiations regarding the payment of a bribe, in an amount of up
to US$100,000, to obtain their freedom. I was not a party to
these negotiations, and in fact immediately relayed my concerns
quietly to the St. Vincent Ambassador to the United States,
whom I knew, and to the U.S. Embassy. To my dismay, no one
registered surprise or even concern.
An important event in late November 1996 was the wide-
spread reporting in the St. Vincent and South African papers
about the detention of a South African yachtsman Alan Heath,
whose yacht was clandestinely boarded while it was anchored in
St. Vincent. After his wife was brutally murdered during the
boarding, the St. Vincent police threatened to charge Mr. Heath
with the crime. After the South African government furnished
evidence about Mr. Heath, the St. Vincent government assured
the South African government that it would release him due to
lack of evidence. The St. Vincent government, however, contin-
ued to detain Mr. Heath until his family paid US$25,000, which
happened to be the amount of a life insurance policy on his de-
ceased wife and which the St. Vincent government learned about
from the South African government.
Since I was delivering a speech at the beginning of January
in the Cayman Islands, I arranged to visit St. Vincent. Shortly
after my arrival, attorneys in the St. Vincent Attorney General's
office confided that the case was an embarrassment: no tangible
evidence existed showing the Fletchers were responsible and
they held out hope for quick dismissal of the case. However,
when I discussed the case with the Attorney General, whom I
11. For a more detailed discussion of the Fletcher case, see Bruce Zagaris, Lost in
Paradise: Lobbying Strategies for Public International Law Issues, 4 ILSAJ. OF INT'L & CoM,-
Pr. L. 427-54 (1998).
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knew and had taught in anti-money laundering programs in the
region, I learned that the case was not likely to end any time
soon.
From the beginning, I contacted both the U.S. Department
of State's American Overseas Citizens Services Office and the
U.S. Embassy consular officials who were working the case. As
the case continued, my investigation showed that, notwithstand-
ing the U.S. Department of State's denials, their own documents
confirmed my suspicions that the consular officials shared my
same concerns.
My discussions with the Fletchers revealed that: (1) serious
improprieties had occurred during their initial detention and
questioning, including failure to notify the U.S. government
under a Consular Convention, failure to allow the Fletchers any
calls, limited food and drink, and subjection to mental and phys-
ical abuse; and (2) the conditions of their detention were horri-
ble, even though they were only in pre-trial detention.
On February 25, 1997, approximately three months after
their arrest, a preliminary hearing was held and completed on
March 10, 1997. The magistrate found that, although only ex-
tremely limited circumstantial evidence existed, probable cause
existed to bind them over for trials. On May 2, 1997, ABC News
aired a Nightline program about the case. Two days later, Inside
Edition, a national program, aired an expos6. Shortly thereaf-
ter, Extra, a daily tabloid program, regularly aired developments
in the case, including information on the deteriorating medical
conditions of the Fletchers. On a May 5, 1997 radio interview in
St. Vincent, the St. Vincent Prime Minister personally castigated
ABC News, and defended his government's handling of both the
South African's case and the Fletcher case. On May 10, 1997
while meeting Caribbean leaders in Barbados, President Clinton
discussed the Fletcher's case with the St. Vincent Prime Minister,
expressed his concern, and requested the Prime Minister's assur-
ances that the Fletchers be accorded due process. Incidentally,
the main concern at the meeting from the perspective of the
Caribbean was the U.S. action at the World Trade Organization
to end preferential treatment of bananas and the consequential
enormous dislocation for farmers in the Eastern Caribbean.
On May 27, 1997, on the only government-owned radio sta-
tion, the St. Vincent Prime Minister stated that "this couple has
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an unsavory reputation and their behavior... was bizarre and
offensive." The Prime Minister further asserted that "[t]here
certainly appears to be very strong circumstantial evidence that
[the Fletchers] were involved in this tragedy, and many of us
believe they are guilty." On June 6, 1997, Senator Rockefeller
sent a letter to U.S. Secretary of State Albright expressing out-
rage at the Prime Minister's remarks and seeking strident action.
Six members of Congress wrote a similar letter. The media be-
came increasingly interested in the diplomatic ramifications of
the case. Further, the U.S. Congress and the media were also
interested in Penny Fletcher's health. In the spring of 1997, the
pre-cancerous condition of Penny Fletcher deteriorated. Mrs.
Fletcher experienced increasing fainting spells due to her inabil-
ity for months to obtain any adequate treatment.
InJuly 1997, the trial finally started. The St. Vincentian gov-
ernment hired a prominent regional Queen's Counsel from
Trinidad to prosecute the case. He asked the judge to delay the
trial until October and issue a worldwide gag order on coverage
of the trial. When the Fletcher's Puerto Rican attorney went to
St. Vincent for the trial, he was detained at the airport and ques-
tioned about a letter he sent to the U.S. Embassy discussing the
bribe solicitation. As a result of threats of his arrest, he did not
return for trial even though by then he was the attorney who was
directing the litigation strategy. Almost simultaneously, on the
night before the start of trial, R. Gonsalves, the lead local attor-
ney, received a criminal complaint against him that charged him
with contempt for his statements to ABC News three months
before.
On July 14 and 16, 1997, the court held hearings on the
request for a delay of the trial and a gag order. The St. Vincent
Police Commissioner sued the reporter from West Virginia
whose coverage of the case had been featured in the Gannett
papers for writing about the allegation of the extortion attempt
and Senator Rockefeller had to intervene for him to be able to
leave St. Vincent.
After CNN started reporting on the case, the St. Vincent
Prime Minister appeared on the "Burden of Proof' show and the
media became even more interested. When the U.S. Ambassa-
dor visited the highest-ranking official in St. Vincent along with
the family of the defendant, the trial resumed. The judge dis-
missed the case, after the prosecution presented its case, finding
140920001
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no evidence to connect the two U.S. nationals. This case
brought up several important issues.
a. Role of the Executive Branch
The role of the Executive Branch in these cases is critical.
Title 22 U.S.C. § 1732 requires the U.S. President, if it comes to
his attention that an U.S. citizen has been unjustly deprived of
his or her liberty by or under the authority of any foreign gov-
ernment, to demand the reasons of such imprisonment and if it
appears to be wrongful, to forthwith demand the release of such
citizens. If the release so demanded is unreasonably delayed or
refused, then the President must use such means, which do not
amount to acts of war and are not otherwise prohibited by law, as
he may think necessary and proper to obtain or effectuate the
release.
The Foreign Affairs Manual requires U.S. consular officials
to use their "best efforts in protecting the citizens' legal and
human rights." They must use their own creative approach in
achieving these goals. Heroic efforts by Sandra Ingram, a For-
eign Service officer in Barbados, were critical in the case. She
covered the preliminary hearing and reported in detail on pro-
cedural irregularities. We were not able to obtain copies of the
report, however, until after we brought and exhausted our ad-
ministrative appeals under the Freedom of Information Act and
after a Congressional staff member viewed and leaked parts of
the report. The U.S. Department of State took the position that,
despite evidence of irregularities in the handling of this and
other cases, it was not able to do anything. In the end the Exec-
utive Branch, from the consular officials to President Clinton
himself, played an important positive role in ensuring that the
Fletchers received a trial and decent treatment during their pre-
trial detention.
b. Legislative Branch
A key factor in the eventual resolution of the case was the
involvement of the U.S. Congress. At critical stages, key mem-
bers of Congress, such as Jay Rockefeller and Congressman Lee
Hamilton played important roles. They helped galvanize the Ex-
ecutive Branch, the St. Vincent Government, the international
human rights community, and the media. However, until we ob-
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tained the consular report of the pre-trial hearing, we could not
convince the legislators to pay attention.
c. The Media
Perhaps the role of the media was most critical. The media
was partly interested because the murder victim was a "hunk"
who was likeable and was known as a "Romeo" with visiting tour-
ists. The Fletchers were prominent for their wealth and their
wild ways, which included the wife's flaunting her six-shooter,
getting thrown out of a restaurant owned by the Prime Minister's
former wife, and having an ugly fight with the Prime Minister's
cousin and one of his best friends, in which the latter was bitten
in the neck.
A key event occurred in May 1997, when Julia Fletcher, the
couple's fourteen-year-old daughter, along with her step-sisters,
called a news conference and warned the St. Vincent Govern-
ment that "The Whole World Is Watching," a refrain that I was
able to repeat again and again. A Huntington, West Virginia,
newspaper ran a series entitled Prisoners in Paradise, which the
Gannett News Service and AP wires ran. The paper started a
website on the case. Eventually, every network, in addition to
CNN and the tabloids, covered the case. Their coverage and the
importance of tourism for St. Vincent caused the St. Vincent
government to hire a media firm and made it difficult for the
court to act wrongly without consequences.
d. Investigation
A key element in the case was investigation. A person de-
tained must be able to obtain and utilize facts about his or her
case and the surrounding circumstances. Sources of informa-
tion can include U.S. and local investigators, newspapers and re-
porters, and U.S. government reports. Much of the information
gathering can be directed from the United States.
e. International Human Rights Provisions and Fora
An important component of the Fletchers' case was raising
violations of international human rights treaties. I immediately
determined that the St. Vincent Government had ratified the In-
ternational Covenant on Civil & Political Rights and the U.N.
20001 1411
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Universal Declaration of Human Rights.' 2 I brought each viola-
tion to the attention of the Executive and Legislative Branches
and the media. Eventually, I was able to persuade the Lawyers
Committee on Human Rights to issue an urgent Lawyer-to-Law-
yer plea after the Puerto Rican lawyer was detained and the St.
Vincentian lawyer was charged.
International human rights groups have excellent material.
I found the newsletters of the St. Vincent International Human
Rights chapter valuable, although the only place they were car-
ried in the United States was in the Harvard Law Library.
f. Potential Roles of Other Governments
In some cases other governments can play important roles.
In the Fletchers' case, the South African government was ex-
tremely sympathetic and helpful in providing access to key docu-
ments and information about the similarities in the handling of
the South African case.
2. David M. Duchow, State Department Counter-drug
Employee from Louisiana
A second case involves David M. Duchow, a Louisiana citi-
zen who was decorated for his service in Vietnam where he lost
his spleen. He worked for several years as a U.S Department of
State contract employee in Bolivia. In May 1995, he was accused
of embezzling over US$200,000 of fuel supply.
When the Inspector General came to interrogate him,
Duchow requested counsel and information on any charges that
would be filed. As a result, the Inspector General employees be-
came agitated and told him they did not come to "this hellhole"
to have him insist on his rights. They told him he would receive
"Bolivian Justice." Thereafter, he was detained. Eventually he
was released and has been under house arrest. He claims that,
even to file motions, requires payment of money.
A large New Orleans law firm retained me when it filed a
civil action, requesting declaratory relief and mandamus to or-
der the U.S. government to try Duchow in the United States.
The action was over successfully. Eventually, I made an affidavit
12. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, GA. Res. 217 A(III), U.N. GAOR 3d.
Sess, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
Mar. 23, 1976, 999 U.N.T.S. 171.
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for the Bolivian court on the issue of the breach of Duchow's
diplomatic immunity, which the trial court, indeed, used as a ba-
sis to dismiss the case on lack of jurisdiction. While the United
States waived his immunity, it failed to do so until two weeks af-
ter his arrest. The appellate court has affirmed and the case is
now before the Bolivian Supreme Court.
Meanwhile, I have been engaged in a lengthy effort under
the Freedom of Information Act to obtain documents showing
the factual predicate of the case against Mr. Duchow, which he
could obtain in the Bolivian criminal justice process. The day
that the U.S. Department of State had to submit its summary
judgment, I received eighty percent of the documents re-
quested-nearly two years after Mr. Duchow's arrest.
The Duchow case raises many important policy issues. First,
what, if any, standards should exist for waiving diplomatic immu-
nity of U.S. citizens working abroad? Second, should the United
States waive immunity only for serious crimes? Third, should the
United States waive immunity only when the countries that will
prosecute meet minimum due process and international human
rights conditions, which the U.S. Department of State's Interna-
tional Narcotics Control Strategy Report and annual human
rights report claim are not met in Bolivia? Similarly, when
should the United States exercise jurisdiction over criminal
cases, especially when its nationals prefer trial and adjudication?
In the United States, should the U.S. Government have stan-
dards to take into account the rights of the defendant or only its
own goals? Some of these issues are raised in a front-page story
by Warren Richey, U.S. Diplomat Faces Foreign Brand ofJustice.13
The big difference between the two cases in terms of strat-
egy has been money. The impecunious nature of the Duchows
does not allow for elaborate strategy and has required a very se-
lective use of the various mechanisms.
3. Jim Williams, Fish Importer from
Jacksonville Beach, Florida
14
Jim and Robin Williams worked hard in their fish import
business. They both worked exceedingly long hours. Jim was in
13. Warren Richey, U.S. Diplomat Faces Foreign Brand ofJustice, CHRISTIAN SCI. MON.,
Oct. 7, 1998.
14. For background on the case, see Free Jim-American Prisoner in Ecuador
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charge of developing fish suppliers and production while Robin,
a former bank employee, handled all the books, received and
made all payments.
In April 1996, U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI")
agents contacted them because one of their twenty-three fish
suppliers,Jos6 Castrillon, was an alleged drug trafficker. Jim Wil-
liams gave two interviews to FBI and U.S. Drug Enforcement
Agency ("DEA") agents and turned over more than five boxes of
business records in connection with a Tampa grand jury investi-
gation. ByJuly 1996, Williams had not heard from the FBI and
wanted to finish a pending project in Ecuador. His lawyer, a
respected lawyer who was a Harvard graduate and law clerk to
Judge William M. Hoeveler, Senior U.S. District Judge for the
Southern District of Florida, checked with the FBI and relayed
the message that the FBI had no objection to Williams's travel-
ling to Ecuador.
On August 14, 1996, a DEA agent based in Ecuador wrote a
letter to Ecuadorian narcotics officials, identifying Jim Williams
and five other men as members of a "narco-trafficking organiza-
tion." The letter concludes with a request that Williams and the
others be investigated "and steps be taken, as the case may re-
quire for the purposes of disarming this international drug-traf-
ficking organization." In September 1996, Williams arrived in
Ecuador, assuming the FBI had investigated him and believing
that he was in the clear. On his arrival in the hotel, he encoun-
tered dozens of Ecuadorian narcotics policeman and was de-
tained.
Like the Fletchers, he was held incommunicado for some
days and not allowed to make any calls. He was charged with
money laundering conspiracy in connection with his business
dealings with Jos6 Castrillon. Shortly after his arrest, Williams's
lawyer received a call from the same agents, asking if his client
now wanted to cooperate more, since Mr. Williams had told
them that he did not believe Mr. Castrillon had any narcotics
dealings. Much of the evidence used against him consisted of
business records turned over to the FBI and DEA for the Tampa
investigation.
Simultaneously, Jim Williams was prosecuted for the same
(visited Apr. 19, 2000) <http://www.freejim.com> (on file with the Fordham International
Law Journal).
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offense in Panama, although the court has dismissed the
charges. In May 1998, the Panama Government suddenly de-
ported Mr. Castrillon to the United States and the Tampa prose-
cutor unsealed an indictment against Mr. Castrillon and Mr. Wil-
liams.
The U.S. Congress has held hearings on the case. Fourteen
members of Congress have supported a resolution calling for his
release. Although John Shattuck, the former Assistant Secretary
of State for International Human Rights, promised treatment in
accordance with international human rights standards, the fun-
damental violations of Mr. William's rights make a mockery out
of justice. For instance, some of the evidence against Mr. Wil-
liams comes from the Ecuador police. Hence, Mr. Williams
asked that they testify in person and be subject to cross-examina-
tion. They did not come and the judge refused to compel their
presence, but continues to admit and rely on their evidence.
In addition, Mr. Williams's right to "a fair and public hear-
ing by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal" has
been breached. From the beginning, members of Congress have
complained about the apparent influence of the U.S. govern-
ment in this case and representatives of the U.S. government
regularly visit the judge. After Mr. Williams's arrest, the U.S.
Ambassador publicly praised the law enforcement action and the
U.S. government issued press releases. In Ecuador, one cannot
be convicted of money laundering unless the court has convicted
one of a predicate offense. Finally, after approximately two
years, Jim Williams was convicted in a trial, which fell short of
fundamental justice, according to the human rights monitors
who covered the trial.
At first, the U.S. government denied that the United States
had anything to do with Mr. William's arrest. Still, the United
States denies any responsibility. The responses to my requests
under the Freedom of Information Act by the U.S. Department
of State show otherwise. The FBI and DEA have found reasons
to refuse to produce any documents and now produce a few cop-
ies of Congressional Inquiries.
Jimmy Carter himself and the Carter Center have inter-
vened in the case. The International Human Rights Law Clinic
at the Washington College of Law is involved. CBS Sixty Min-
utes, Extra, and other local media have aired reports. The
14152000]
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Miami Herald has published a strong editorial, demanding fair-
ness in the Williams case. The New York Times, Christian Sci-
ence Monitor, and other media have also reported on the case.
The case exhibits many of the same issues in the Duchow
case about the considerations for determining the proper court
when concurrent jurisdiction arises. It raises the propriety of
U.S. law enforcement compelling the production of evidence for
a grand jury investigation and then sending the same informa-
tion to foreign government authorities, especially ones whose
criminal justice system has fundamental problems, according to
the U.S. Department of State's own reports. It also raises the
question of fair treatment and candor by law enforcement au-
thorities.
B. Equality of Arms in the Use of
U.S. Evidence Gathering
From a U.S. perspective, one of the difficulties in defending
allegations of transnational crime is gathering the evidence in
admissible form. Proactive policing vis-a-vis transnational crime
has produced transformations in international criminal coopera-
tion law in the United States. Globalization ensures that the
number of transnational criminal investigations and prosecu-
tions involving the United States will increase. Undoubtedly, an
increasing number of cases will bring into play the potential ap-
plicability of the various rights guaranteed by the U.S. Bill of
Rights and the applicable provisions of international human
rights conventions, such as the International Civil and Political
Covenant.' 5 The tension between the need for the United States
to cooperate more with national governments and international
tribunals and the concern for the fulfillment of constitutional
and international human rights standards is likely to continue to
build.
1. U.S. Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties
Recent U.S. mutual legal assistance treaties (or "MLAT") in
criminal matters that grant the government compulsory process
rights, as delimited by the respective treaties, expressly state that
the treaties do not create a right for a "private person" to obtain
15. For background, see Michael Abbell & Mark Andrew Sherman, The Bill of
Rights in Transnational Criminal Litigation, CaWioN 22-29 (1992).
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evidence. The purpose is to prevent the MLAT from being used
to suppress or exclude evidence or to impede investigations.
Hence, if an adversely affected person wants to prevent the exe-
cution of a request, which he or she believes was made in viola-
tion of the MLAT, then his or her only recourse under the
MIAT is to the executive authority of the requested country, not
to its courts. Similarly, if an accused wishes to contest that the
requested country violated the terms of the MLAT in executing a
request, then he or she may do so only to the executive authori-
ties of the respective countries.
The MLAT provisions do not prevent a person adversely af-
fected by a request or its execution from asserting whatever
rights he or she has under the laws of the appropriate country in
its courts. For instance, a person whose home or place of busi-
ness was searched and whose property was seized under a search
warrant issued pursuant to an MLAT request may assert whatever
rights he or she has under the laws of the requested country to
prevent that property from being turned over to the requesting
country. Similarly, a person whose records have been subpoe-
naed pursuant to an MLAT request may assert whatever rights he
or she has, under the laws of the requested country, to prevent
the production of those records or their transmittal to the re-
questing country. An affected person would also presumably be
able to seek to enjoin the requested country from taking an ac-
tion not authorized by the MLAT or its laws.' 6 In at least one
case in which a defendant sought to use a U.S. MLAT in criminal
matters to obtain evidence from a U.S. treaty partner pursuant
to a treaty which was silent with respect to a defendant's right to
seek evidence under it, the trial court directed the U.S. Depart-
ment of Justice to make a treaty request on behalf of the defend-
ant.'
7
In a recent case in which I was involved, the defendants
were able to persuade the U.S. court to order the U.S. govern-
ment to allow the defendants to make use of a U.S. MLAT. In
particular, the court ordered that the defense counsel and U.S.
government agree on a procedure to allow defense counsel to
16. See 3 MICHAEL ABBELL & RISTAU, INTERNATIONAL JUDICIAL ASSISTANCE § 124-7.
17. The request was made by the U.S. Department ofJustice to Switzerland at the
direction of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York in In re Sidona,
584 F. Supp. 1437 (E.D.N.Y. 1984). See 3 MhCHAEL ABBELL & RISTAU, INTERNATIONAL
JUDICIAL AssISTANcE § 12-2-1.
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utilize the applicable MLAT for a series of witnesses whose depo-
sitions abroad were required and for other evidence gathering.
If the defense counsel and the U.S. government could not reach
agreement, then the court indicated it would set a hearing and
make rulings. The court expressed sympathy to the need for de-
fense counsel to employ proactively the MLAT. Defense counsel
and the U.S. government did reach accommodation on the pro-
cedure. However, when it came to implementation, defense
counsel was able to obtain a much more favorable plea offer
and, eventually, achieved a plea agreement.' 8
The U.S. government has agreed to provisions in its MLATs
that accommodate concerns of its treaty partners about safe-
guarding provisions on international human rights. For in-
stance, in the MLAT between the United States and Australia,
signed on April 30, 1997, the term "essential interests" that may
be invoked to deny assistance to a requesting state includes a
discretionary limitation on providing assistance in death penalty
cases.
19
2. Equality of Arms in Tax Information Exchanges
One area in which the target of government international
investigations can be disadvantaged is the area of administrative
penal law. The United States and other governments have con-
cluded mini-mutual assistance agreements in a broad range of
enforcement cooperation areas, such as antitrust, customs, tax,
recovery and return of stolen airplanes and vehicles, recovery
and return of stolen cultural property, asset forfeiture, drug en-
forcement, and so forth.
An example of this problem concerns tax information ex-
changes. To understand the application of the new tax informa-
tion exchange agreements (or "TIEA"), requires a detailed con-
sideration of the different examination procedures, including
the circumstances under which the types of information ex-
changes are started, continued, terminated, or expanded. In ad-
dition, an understanding of the new TIEA program requires a
detailed consideration of mutual assistance procedures, assist-
18. U.S. v. Nanne Hogendoom et a4 U.S. District Court for the District of Alaska,
Case No. A98-0087-CR KS), Transcript of Proceedings, Status Conference, July 15,
1999.
19. Treaty with Australia on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, S. Treaty Doc.
No. 105-27, at pmbl. (1997).
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ance in collection, and how the new information exchange pro-
cedures fit into these elements. One consideration that this Es-
say does not discuss in detail, for instance, is whether the Inter-
nal Revenue Service ("IRS") or its tax treaty partner may find an
alternative procedure, either statutory or through another treaty
more effective and expeditious than utilizing a TIEA. Although
that discussion is beyond the scope of this Essay, a review of the
salient points of U.S. procedure on obtaining and exchanging
information follows.
Internal Revenue Code ("I.R.C.") Section 6103(k) (4) au-
thorizes disclosure of information with foreign countries. In
particular, it states:
A return or return information may be disclosed to a compe-
tent authority of a foreign government which has an income
tax or gift and estate tax convention or other convention re-
lating to the exchange of tax information, with the United
States but only to the extended provided in, and subject to
the terms and conditions of, such convention.
2 0
The Caribbean Basin Initiative tax information exchange agree-
ments are treated as income tax conventions for purposes of Sec-
tion 6103(k)(4), under IRS Section 274(h)(6)(C). The U.S.
"Competent Authority" is the Associate Commissioner (Opera-
tions). The authority to act as U.S. Competent Authority was re-
delegated for administering most of the international exchange
and examination programs to the Associate Commissioner (Op-
erations) .21
In connection with the submission of the Council of Eu-
rope/Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development
("COE/OECD") Convention on Mutual Administrative Assist-
ance in Tax Matters22 ("Convention on Mutual Assistance"), the
U.S. Department of the Treasury reported over five years ago
that it would prepare regulations providing U.S. taxpayers more
comprehensive opportunity to be informed of and participate in
U.S. requests to provide information to foreign treaty partners.
Initially the regulations are designed just for the Convention on
20. IRC § 103(K)(4) (1988).
21. For a status report on the work of the Caribbean Law Institute on the Carib-
bean Basin Initiative, see a report prepared by Prof. Ralph Carnegie, Commercial Law
Survey Seminar (Jan. 15, 1990) (unpublished) (on file with the author).
22. Convention on Mutual Administrativae Assistance in Tax Matters, opened for
signature Jan. 25, 1988, 27 I.L.M. 1160 (1988).
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Mutual Assistance, the Office of International Tax Counsel has
stated that these regulations would probably apply to requests
received by the United States on other TIEAs generally. This
area of taxpayer notification and participation is important as
the TIEAs become more intensely utilized. Effective procedures
will provide safeguards against abuse. The lack of promulgation
of the regulations, after the United States has ratified the Con-
vention on Mutual Assistance, jeopardizes the ability of U.S. citi-
zens to receive notice and have an opportunity to participate in
requests by foreign tax authorities.
a. Disclosure of Information to Foreign Tax Authorities
(United States as Requested State)
When the United States receives a request by a foreign
country with which it has a tax treaty, the request is transmitted
to the U.S. Competent Authority.23 The Assistant Commissioner
(International) or the Associate Commissioner (Operations), in
sensitive cases, authorizes the exchanges. The Philadelphia Ser-
vice Center handles certain automatic or "routine" exchanges
(i.e., reports of taxes withheld from income paid to nonresident
aliens).
The Assistant Commissioner (International) usually for-
wards requests for information to the appropriate IRS offices.
When the Assistant Commissioner receives the requested infor-
mation, he or she prepares a response for the signature of the
Assistant Commissioner (International), transmitting the infor-
mation to the foreign Competent Authority. The Assistant Com-
missioner (International) will authorize any disclosure for re-
quests pertaining to the Simultaneous Criminal Investigation
Program.
For treaty partner requests under the Simultaneous Exami-
nation Program or Industry-wide Exchange of Information, the
Assistant Commissioner (International) or the Associate Com-
missioner (Operations), in sensitive cases, will forward the re-
quest to the District Director for action and, when the informa-
tion is received, transmit it to the treaty partner's competent au-
thority. In the case of Spontaneous Exchanges of Information,
the Assistant Commissioner (International) or the Associate
Commissioner (Operations), in sensitive cases, will forward a
23. For a discussion of these provisions, see I.RC. § 6103(e) (7) (1999).
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U.S.-initiated exchange to the treaty partner's competent au-
thority.
Normally, the United States does not furnish returns to for-
eign tax authorities pursuant to tax treaties. If the U.S. Compe-
tent Authority needs to issue a summons in order to obtain the
requested information, then it will prepare and forward the sum-
mons to Branch One, Associate Chief Counsel (International)
for review prior to issuance. The U.S. Competent Authority ex-
cludes from the exchange of information the provisions of the
treaties and, hence, from their transmission pursuant to re-
quests, information that would reveal business or trade secrets.
The U.S. Competent Authority must account 24 pursuant to
I.R.C. Section 6103(p) (3) and the Privacy Act of 1974 for disclo-
sures to foreign tax authorities made pursuant to tax treaties.
When the United States needs to obtain third party informa-
tion, such as from a bank or trust company, the IRS will issue a
summons and the taxpayer will learn of the request. In such
cases, the U.S. taxpayer can intervene and raise any applicable
defenses. If the United States does not need to issue a sum-
mons, then the U.S. taxpayer may not learn of the request and
cannot object (e.g., because of the potential for injury to its trade
or business or show that the request is for a political reason or a
reason unrelated to a tax examination).
b. Non-treaty Disclosure to Foreign Countries
In addition to the authority for disclosure of return infor-
mation to foreign tax authorities in I.R.C. Section 6103(k) (4),
other provisions of Section 6103 allow limited disclosures to for-
eign countries or individuals of foreign countries in certain situ-
ations.25 Such disclosures can be made regardless of whether
the United States has a tax treaty with the country. The United
States, however, exchanges information under a tax treaty, when
one is in effect, to the extent possible. Return information may
be disclosed by IRS employees to individuals of foreign countries
pursuant to I.R.C. Section 6103 (k) (6). Returns and return infor-
mation may also be disclosed to individuals of foreign countries
24. For further background on this section, see I.RM. (25) (30), Disclosure of In-
formation to Foreign Tax Authorities, MT 1272-66 from which this account draws heav-
ily.
25. Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. § 522a (1994).
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designated in writing by a U.S. taxpayer to receive such informa-
tion in accordance with I.R.C. Section 6103(c) and (e). For in-
stance, if a taxpayer has made a written request and signed a
consent for disclosure, the IRS can certify to a tax treaty country
that taxes were paid in the United States to enable the taxpayer
to receive a credit for the taxes on a foreign return.
3. Equality of Arms in Antitrust Enforcement
An area of potential inequality of arms between the defense
and prosecution that concerns another aspect of mini-mutual
assistance agreements is the area of antitrust enforcement coop-
eration. For example, on April 27, 1999, the United States and
Australia signed an antitrust mutual assistance agreement that
will allow the two countries to exchange evidence and assist each
other's antitrust investigative efforts. One of the highlights of
this agreement is that the signatories agree to assist one another
and to cooperate on a reciprocal basis in providing or obtaining
antitrust evidence, through a variety of means, pursuant to their
respective mutual assistance legislation, and regardless of
whether the conduct underlying a request would violate the anti-
trust laws of the requested party.26 The agreement provides for
assistance in both civil and criminal antitrust matters.
The potential jeopardy to the person under investigation in
multiple countries is exemplified by the recent decision in In Re:
Impounded.27 On May 13, 1999, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit upheld the recent prohibition disallowing defend-
ants from asserting the right against self-incrimination due to
fear of foreign prosecutions. The interesting twist was that the
case concerned joint prosecution involving Canada, France, Ger-
many, Mexico, Spain, the United Kingdom, the United States,
and other countries to obtain documents for the grand jury in-
vestigation.28
In particular, the case involved the issue of when a fear of
foreign prosecution implicates the Fifth Amendment privilege
after the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Bal-
26. Agreement Between the Government of the United States and the Govern-
ment of Australia on Mutual Antitrust Enforcement Assistance, art. II.F, also available in
U.S. Department of Justice: Antitrust Division (visited Apr. 19, 2000) <http://
www.usdoj.gov/atr> (on file with the Fordham Intrnational Law Journal).
27. In re: Impounded, 178 F.3d 150 (3rd Cir. 1999).
28. Id.
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sys.29 The appellants were immunized witnesses who refused to
testify before a grand jury, claiming that their case fell within a
test articulated in Balsys requiring Fifth Amendment protection.
On October 29, 1997, a special grand jury was impaneled in the
District of NewJersey to investigate possible price-fixing or other
anticompetitive agreements among manufacturers and distribu-
tors in the artificial sausage casings industry that may have vio-
lated Section I of the Sherman Act.3 0 The appellants were em-
ployees of a corporation targeted in the investigation. Each of
them appeared before the grand jury pursuant to a subpoena
and an immunity order of the district court compelling their tes-
timony. While the employees were willing to answer questions
relating to certain business dealings within the United States,
they refused to answer questions about activities that occurred
outside the United States, claiming that the court's compulsion
order and grant of immunity gave inadequate protection against
foreign prosecution. After the U.S. prosecutors moved to hold
employees in contempt, they asked the court to order a hearing
at which they could question the U.S. government concerning
contacts with foreign governments relating to the investigation.
The employees argued before the U.S. district court and on
appeal that language in the Supreme Court's opinion in Balsys
established a test for when a foreign prosecution triggers a de-
fendant's Fifth Amendment rights. This prosecution, they
claimed, comes within the Balsys test because it is part of a coop-
erative international antitrust enforcement. They showed evi-
dence of a "standing policy" that included selections from
speeches by Antitrust Division officials that discussed increasing
"internationalization" of antitrust enforcement, "positive comity"
initiatives with other countries for information and evidence
sharing, and two prior criminal antitrust investigations with the
Canadian government. They also cited substantive criminal pen-
alties in other countries for antitrust violations and also cited
twelve countries as additional evidence of increasing internation-
alization of antitrust law. They contend that the policy of inter-
nationalization also includes the use of MLATs in criminal mat-
ters in obtaining information and also the use of the grand jury
in aiding foreign prosecutions, through the International Anti-
29. United States v. Balsys, 524 U.S. 666, 118 S. Ct. 2218, 141 L. Ed. 2d 575 (1998).
30. Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1990).
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trust Enforcement Assistance Act.
31
Appellants contended in the district court that ajoint inter-
national prosecution had occured in their cases. They cited as
evidence of that joint prosecution: (1) questioning of grand jury
witnesses about Canadian and German contacts; (2) efforts by
the Antitrust Division in Canada, France, Germany, Mexico,
Spain, the United Kingdom, and other countries, to obtain doc-
uments for the grand jury investigation; and (3) efforts by the
Antitrust Division to question Mexican and German nationals.
Additionally, appellants also contended that Canadian authori-
ties contacted one of their counsel and that this event also repre-
sented evidence of a joint prosecution. Hence, appellants con-
tended they were facing a "whipsaw" in which they could be com-
pelled to produce information in this country, and yet be
prosecuted in other nations. They claimed that the Antitrust Di-
vision wanted to use the witnesses' testimony about foreign ef-
fects of their conduct to instigate a foreign prosecution based on
the grand jury's investigation.
Employees also claimed that they required a hearing to
question government witnesses since they could not otherwise
develop their proof regarding foreign contacts. In response to
employees' arguments, the governments disclosed a set of affida-
vits and submitted separate ones in camera, stating that the com-
pelled testimony was sought by the United States "[t] o advance
the grand jury's inquiry and not for another purpose" and that
testimony was not wanted for the purpose of delivering that testi-
mony to a foreign nation. The employees argued that this gov-
ernment proffer was inadequate since it could be inferred from
their evidence that the Antitrust Division had already been shar-
ing information with foreign authorities for the purpose of for-
eign prosecutions. They argued that these facts showed that due
process required that the nature and extent of the relationships
between the United States and other countries in this case be
explained, and that the evidence they produced mandated an
evidentiary hearing.
The court held hearings on the legal issues and accepted
the government's pronouncements to the effect that the infor-
mation to be obtained was only to be used for a U.S. prosecu-
tion, that the employees had not raised a genuine issue of mate-
31. Pub. L. No. 103-438, 108 Stat. 4597, codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 6201-6212 (1994).
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rial fact requiring an evidentiary hearing, and denied the em-
ployee's motion to compel witnesses and their motion for an
evidentiary hearing on their claims that the evidence would be
used in foreign investigations. Finally, the district court found
that Balsys did not provide a basis for the employees' claims of
Fifth Amendment privilege and held them in contempt.
The employees filed an appeal from the contempt order,
contending that the district court erred in not accepting their
assertions of privilege and by determining that an evidentiary
hearing was not required to determine the merit of their Fifth
Amendment claims and their due process rights. The appellate
court noted that the Balsys court concluded that fear of foreign
prosecution, without more, was not an adequate basis for the in-
vocation of a Fifth Amendment privilege against compelled self-
incrimination.
The employees focused on the language in the Balsys opin-
ion that provides for a test for an exception to the general rule,
whereby the Fifth Amendment privilege may be recognized and
connected with fear of foreign prosecution. Justice David Souter
in Balsys said that it is conceivable that cooperative conduct be-
tween the United States and other countries could develop to a
point at which a claim could be made for recognizing fear of
foreign prosecution under the self-incrimination Clause. In par-
ticular, it is possible that the United States and its counterparts
had enacted substantially similar codes aimed at prosecuting of-
fenses of international character. It could be demonstrated that
the United States was granting immunity from domestic prosecu-
tion for the purpose of obtaining evidence to be delivered to
other countries as prosecutors of a crime common to both coun-
tries, then a defendant or witness could argue that the Fifth
Amendment should apply based on fear of foreign prosecution
because that prosecution was not fairly characterized as uniquely
"foreign." Justice Souter distinguished the situation of Mr. Bal-
sys because the United States, while assisting Lithuania and
Israel in their interest in prosecuting Mr. Balsys for the alleged
crimes committed during World War II, did not do enough to
rise to the "level of cooperative prosecution." Hence, there was
no "system of complementary substantive offenses at issue."
3 2
The employees claimed that the Souter language in Balsys
32. Balsys, 118 S. Ct. at 2235-36.
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provides a test for determining whether an individual may claim
a Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination based on
fear of foreign prosecution. The test considers whether: (1) the
witness's fear of foreign prosecution is reasonable; (2) the fear is
based on a foreign criminal statute substantively similar to U.S.
law; and (3) the testimony is taken with a purpose that it will be
shared with a foreign government.
The appellate court rejected the employees' arguments that
Balsys "necessarily establishes a 'test,' let alone the test they
urge." Interestingly, the appellate court also concluded that the
employees' characterization of the "joint internationalization" of
antitrust enforcement in the context of the case was not enough
to demonstrate "joint prosecution" as contemplated by Balsys.
The appellate court also focused on Justice Souter's effort to dis-
tinguish between "cooperative prosecution" and "[m]ere sup-
port of one nation for the prosecutorial efforts of another."
33
The appellate court interpreted the district court's findings as
showing that employees had no "reasonable" fear of prosecution
under their perspective of Balsys. Finally, the appellate court
ruled that the employees did not show that the denial by the
district court of their motion for an evidentiary hearing did not
deny them due process because they had shown enough to merit
an evidentiary hearing and override the discretion of the court
in denying such a hearing.
The decision in In re: Impounded 4 shows the sloppy distinc-
tions made by the Supreme Court in Balsys, apparently due in
part to its lack of understanding about international criminal
and enforcement cooperation. U.S. law enforcement authorities
can easily characterize their efforts as merely in support of for-
eign governments and not ajoint effort that rises to the "level of
cooperative prosecution" or a "system of complementary sub-
stantive offenses." The reality is that in many investigations the
multiple agencies involved from each country may have multiple
goals and such goals may evolve and meander over months so
that even the effort to try to characterize their purposes will be a
meaningless and foolhardy exercise. Similarly, trying to gauge
whether any international enforcement assistance, especially in a
complex transnational case, rises to the "level of cooperative
33. Id.
34. In re Impounded, 178 F.3d 150 (3rd Cir. 1999).
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prosecution" or to a "system of complementary substantive of-
fenses," will be an ephemeral, elusive gesture.
Unlike Balsys, now more than a mere alien individual is in-
volved. In re: Impounded involves U.S. multinationals and the po-
tential subjection of their key employees to criminal investiga-
tion and prosecution. Apparently, there are thirty antitrust
grand jury investigations pending. Hence, the economic and
justice stakes are high. The lack of balance in Balsys and In re:
Impounded show the need for a legislative remedy. Indeed, the
exposure of U.S. multinationals and their key employees to the
potential of criminal investigations and the loss of the right
against self-incrimination may be the catalyst for legislative ac-
tion.
4. Equality of Arms in Asset Forfeiture
Much of U.S. law on enforcement of penal sanctions is at
the state level.35 The United States has no problem in forfeiting
funds that are derived from or are the instrumentality for the
commission of crimes covered by forfeiture laws. 6
The United States has comparatively few criminal coopera-
tion treaties and statutory provisions that concern enforcement
of penal judgments, although this area has critical importance,
especially when dealing with individuals and entities with convic-
tions abroad and applications for banking, casinos, the arms
business, alcohol beverages, piloting planes and boats, and so
forth. While the United States has ratified the U.N. Vienna
Drug Convention of 1988 ("1988 Vienna Drug Convention"), it
participated in the preparation of, but did not sign or ratify, the
Council of Europe Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure
and Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime of 1990 ("Euro-
35. For background on U.S. recognition and execution of foreign and interna-
tional penal sanctions, see INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAw CASES Am MATERAIs 597-626
(. Paust et al., 1996).
36. One recent case involving the forfeiture of funds used in transnational organ-
ized crime was United States v. Nine Million Forty One Thousand, Five Hundred Ninety
Eight Dollars and Sixty Eight Cents, U.S. District Court, Houston, Docket No. H-95-
3182. See Federal Court Ruling Goes Against Ex-Mexico Official Ruiz MassieuJudgment Puts
Lock on $9 Million Deposited at Houston Bank, HOUSTON CHRON., Apr. 29, 1997, at 12;
Bruce Zagaris &Julia Padierna Peralta, Mexico-US. Extradition and Alternatives: From Fu-
gitive Slaves to Drug Traffickers-150 Years and Beyond the Rio Grande's Winding Courses, 12
AM. UJ. OF INT'L L. & PoL'y 521, 598-603 (1997).
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pean Laundering Convention")." The European Laundering
Convention has several advantages over the 1988 Vienna Drug
Convention. The obligation to criminalize money laundering is
not restricted to drug trafficking offenses. Instead, it extends to
any "predicate offense." An important purpose of the European
Laundering Convention is to facilitate international cooperation
concerning investigative assistance, search, seizure, and confisca-
tion of the proceeds from all types of criminality, especially seri-
ous crimes, and particularly drug offenses, arms dealing, terror-
ist offenses, trafficking in children and young women, as well as
other offenses that generate large profits."8 Article 2 of the Eu-
ropean Laundering Convention imposes "a positive obligation
for states to enact legislation which would enable them to confis-
cate instrumentalities and proceeds" on an all crimes while hold-
ing out the possibility of taking a reservation as to the categories
of offenses covered. The European Laundering Convention re-
quires signatories to consider the domestic adoption of a
number of special investigative techniques "which are common
practice in some states but which are not yet implemented in
other states."39 In particular, Article 4(2) mentions monitoring
orders, observation, interception of telecommunications, access
to computer systems, and orders to produce specific documents.
The permissive wording, however, is designed to provide flexibil-
ity to encompass other investigative tools that commend them-
selves to the law enforcement community because of their utility
in handling complex crimes.4'
U.S. forfeiture law provides for jurisdiction either in rem
(venue based on the presence of the thing),41 or in personam
37. Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds
from Crime, Nov. 8, 1990, 30 I.L.M. 148; Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic
Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, opened for signature Dec. 20, 1988, 1992 Gr. Brit.
T.S. No. 26 (Cmnd. 1927), 28 I.L.M. 493. For background on the international aspects
of international asset forfeiture law and international and foreign law from a U.S. policy
perspective, see Bruce Zagaris & Elizabeth Kingma, Asset Forfeiture International and For-
eign Law: An Emerging Regime, 5 EMORY INT'L L. REv. 446-513 (1991).
38. Explanatory Report on the Convention on Laundering Search, Seizure and Confiscation
of the Proceeds from Crime, reproduced in INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS To COMBAT MONEY LAUN-
DERING 193 (W. Gilmore, ed., 1992).
39. Id. at 205.
40. WiL..u C. GiLMoRE, DiRlY MONEY- THE EVOLUTION OF MONEY LAUNDERUNG
COUNIER-MEASuRES 142-43 (1995).
41. 28 U.S.C. § 1395 (1999).
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(venue based on a criminal case against the owner).42 The latter
is based on minimum contacts with the forum states. In personam
permits a prosecutor to consolidate actions against property
seized in several counties, states, or even countries.43 Hence, ju-
risdiction exists for all interests in property if the property for
which forfeiture is sought is within this state at the time the ac-
tion is filed. In addition, jurisdiction exists if there is an interest
of an owner or the interest holder is subject to personal jurisdic-
tion of the forum. As a result, proceeds of drug dealing in State
X may be forfeited in State Y, into which they have been
brought, and an in personam defendant may be ordered to sur-
render tile to a load-vehicle van, airplane, or bank account ti-
fled or located in State A to a court in State B, into which his
drug enterprise spread, but in which state the van, airplane, or
bank account itself had not been used.
The permissive jurisdiction for in personam cases permits ex-
peditious adjudication of forfeitures even though items of prop-
erty or defendants are located in different countries. 44 However,
practical considerations of resources, investigative support, attor-
ney expertise, and location of evidence often have major impact
on venue selection. Flexibility tends to encourage consolidating
cases efficiently. A consolidated case is less expensive for claim-
ants than a set or series of fragmented cases spread over several
countries.45
U.S. courts can order the forfeiture of any other property of
a person, including a claimant in a forfeiture case, up to the
value of the property found by the court to be subject to forfei-
ture if any of the forfeitable property cannot be located, has
been transferred, conveyed, or sold to a third party, is beyond
the jurisdiction of the court, has been substantially diminished
in value, has been commingled, or is subject to an exempt inter-
est.46 For instance, if ABC Exchange House ("ABC") is indicted
42. 21 U.S.C. § 881(j) (1996).
43. For additional background on the operation of U.S. asset forfeiture law, see
Peter J. Henning, Individual Liability for Conduct by Criminal Organizations in the United
States, Report Submitted by the American National Section, AIDP, § IV. (B).
44. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 881(j) (1990).
45. For additional background on jurisdiction in asset forfeiture cases in the U.S.,
see The House, President's Commission on Model State Drug Laws, Economic Remedies, at A 35
(Dec. 1993).
46. Food and Drug Act, 21 U.S.C. § 853(p) (1996); President's Commission, supra
note 37, Economic Remedies, at A 58.
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for participating in money laundering and its assets were trans-
ferred overseas, immediately before or after the indictment and
before a freeze order, then a court can order the forfeiture of
substitute assets or other property of ABC equal in value to the
leased equipment.
With respect to confiscation of the proceeds of crime and
pursuant to the provisions of the 1988 U.S. law, the Departments
of Justice, State, and Treasury have aggressively tried to en-
courage foreign governments to cooperate in joint investigations
of drug trafficking and money laundering, by offering the in-
ducement of sharing in forfeited assets. The United States has
encouraged spending these assets to improve narcotics law en-
forcement. The long-term goal has been to encourage govern-
ments to improve asset forfeiture laws and procedures, and un-
dertake independent investigations.
At times, U.S. agencies simultaneously will employ multiple
mechanisms and conventions to freeze and seize assets. The
Colello, et al v. United States Securities and Exchange Commission, et
al.4 7 case is interesting for the adjudication by a U.S. court of an
MIAT in the context of a transnational securities investigation in
a prejudgment situation. In a decision that has potentially im-
portant implications for international criminal cooperation, a
California court has held that a freeze of a target's bank account
in a U.S. securities enforcement investigation is unconstitu-
tional, because it violates the target bank's Fifth Amendment
right to due process and Fourth Amendment right to be pro-
tected from unreasonable seizures.48
The case started as a derivative action of a U.S. Securities
and Exchange Commission ("SEC") enforcement action. The
SEC sued one of the plaintiffs, Michael Colello, for his role in a
pyramid scheme. Colello asserted his Fifth Amendment right
against self-incrimination during the investigative stage and has
maintained his silence consistently. The day before the SEC
filed the enforcement action against Colello and the other de-
fendants, the SEC sought to freeze Colello's bank accounts in
Switzerland. The U.S. Department of Justice transmitted a re-
47. Colello, et al. v. United States Securities and Exchange Commission, et al., 908
F. Supp. 738 (C.D. Cal. 1995).
48. Id.
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quest under the U.S.-Swiss MLAT in Criminal Matters49 and the
Swiss complied.
Simultaneously with the SEC enforcement action, the court
issued a temporary restraining order in the enforcement action,
freezing all the defendants's assets in the United States, includ-
ing Colello's assets. District CourtJudge Richard Paez refused to
grant the SEC's motion for a preliminary injunction against
Colello and the domestic asset freeze dissolved along with the
temporary restraining order. Colello and plaintiff Robert Ro-
mano, who is not a defendant in the enforcement action, filed a
separate case on September 2, 1994, to challenge the constitu-
tionality of the Swiss asset freeze. They named as defendants the
SEC, its lawyers, and the Director of the Office of International
Affairs, Criminal Division, U.S. Department of Justice.
The SEC commenced the investigation in October 1993
against Cross Financial Services, Inc. ("CFS"), after discovering
through a newspaper article that CFS promised very high rates
of return to investors in a "government receivables" investment
program. On December 3, 1993, the SEC issued a formal order
of investigation. In April 1994, the SEC subpoenaed records and
testimony from Michael Colello in connection with the investiga-
tion of CFS. When the SEC lawyers asked Colello during his in-
vestigative testimony about CFS, Carroll Siemens, letters of
credit, European and U.S. banks, and his bank accounts, he as-
serted his right against self-incrimination and refused to an-
swer.
50
On June 13, 1994, the U.S Department of Justice sent a re-
quest for assistance from the Swiss Government under the
MLAT. The U.S. Department of Justice sought documents and
testimony from banks in Switzerland to establish whether CFS
made false statements about its investment scheme to induce
people to invest and, thereafter, misappropriated investors'
funds in violation of U.S. federal securities laws. In addition, the
SEC requested that any funds traceable to the subject matter of
the request be frozen so that the funds later may be returned to
the United States to compensate the victims of the fraud.
On June 15, 1995, the Swiss Federal Supreme Court re-
49. Treaty on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, May 25, 1973, U.S.-Switzer-
land, 27 U.S.T. 2019, T.IAS. No. 8302 (entered into force Jan. 23, 1977).
50. Co/elo, 908 F. Supp. at 741.
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jected plaintiffs' contention that the asset freeze was improper.
It explained that in matters of judicial assistance, the Swiss Fed-
eral Supreme Court examines an administrative court complaint
only to determine whether the preconditions for the provisions
ofjudicial assistance have been fulfilled. If the judicial assistance
is requested by the United States, it then cannot be denied just
on the basis of deficiencies in the U.S. proceedings, because the
MLAT does not contain any corresponding provision.
In ruling that the freeze was an unconstitutional seizure in
violation of the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution, the
court rejected the government's contention that plaintiffs "as-
sumed the risk" of depositing their money in a foreign country.
The court, citing Reid v. Covert,5 instead, stated that U.S. citi-
zens are protected by the Bill of Rights from incursions from the
U.S. government on his or his property regardless of its location.
Similarly the court found no authority for the government's no-
tion that it can circumscribe or limit the entitlement of citizens
to constitutional rights via a treaty.52 The court was troubled by
the fact that freezing is permitted under the treaty based on "rea-
sonable suspicion," whereas the Fourth Amendment requires
showing "probable cause."
The court appeared troubled by the absence of implement-
ing legislation and regulations, although legislation was initially
contemplated. The court also noted that, while the U.S. Depart-
ment of Justice Manual ("Manual") governs the conduct of the
SEC and the Department of Justice, it does not require them to
notify the subject of a treaty request or to provide a hearing
before or after making the request. In addition, the court noted
that the Manual contains no standards, and contains a dis-
claimer that the Manual provides only internal Department of
Justice guidance and is not intended to be relied on to create
any rights, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law by any
party in any matter civil or criminal. In addition, it states that no
limitations are placed on otherwise lawful prerogatives of the De-
partment of Justice."
The absence of statutory and regulatory provisions in the
51. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 77 S. Ct. 1222, 1 L. Ed. 2d 1148 (1957); Colello, 908
F. Supp. at 748.
52. Colello, 908 F. Supp. at 748.
53. Id. at 751-52.
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United States contrasts with Switzerland's approach. 4 Switzer-
land has enacted law and guidelines under the MLAT. Switzer-
land's Federal Law on the MLAT in Criminal Matters with the
United States of October 3, 1975, provides for certain "precau-
tionary measures" to guarantee due process through requiring
notice to the affected parties. In addition, the Federal Office for
Police Matters ("FOPM") has also issued guidelines to inform
interested authorities and citizens on what is meant and encom-
passed by international mutual assistance in criminal matters.55
The decision may presage trouble on other criminal cooper-
ation agreements when the U.S. government tries to enforce
them in courts. Indeed, although the American Bar Association
and other interested bar groups testified previously against ex-
cluding from such treaties the due process rights of defendants
and third parties, the U.S. government vehemently opposed. 6
The decision seems to indicate that at least the court believes
that a better balance is constitutionally required.
A problem in foreign countries with confiscation has been
ineffective custodianship over the assets seized. In a case in
Guyana the defendant eventually was acquitted in a criminal
case. When he went to reclaim his Mercedes Benz, he found it
stripped. The incident triggered additional litigation. The oper-
ation of asset forfeiture and its perceived unfairness to owners of
the assets has generated substantial litigation as well as efforts in
the U.S. Congress to try to remedy the situation through legisla-
tion, but Congress has been divided. The fairness issue is de-
rived partly from the fact that the law enforcement official who
decides key issues about whether to forfeit will benefit from the
successful forfeiture since law enforcement agencies are able to
keep the assets or the proceeds from their sale.
54. For the Swiss approach to confiscation of assets, see Nathalie Kohler, The Con-
fiscation of Criminal Assets in the United States and Switzerland, 13 Hous. J. INT'L L. 1-28
(1990).
55. Colello, 908 F. Supp. at 752.
56. Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty Concerning the Cayman Islands, Hearing, Sen-
ate Foreign Relations Committee, Sen. Exec. Rept. 100-26, 100th Congr., 2d Sess., reso-
lution of the American Bar Association, at 186-90; Statement of Bruce Zagaris, 166-68,
205-12; Teresita Ferrera, Second MLAT Hearings Spark Debate on Policy Issues, 4 INT'L EN-
FORCEMENT L. REP. 917 (1988); Bruce Zagaris, Sen. Helms'Inquiries over Individual Rights
in MLATs Delay Mark-up, 4 INT'L ENFoR EmNT L. RE. 160 (1988).
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II. EXTRADITION
The new U.S. extradition treaties have expanded the ability
of "relators" to waive their rights to extradition hearings. They
no longer require the intervention of a court to determine that
the waiver was made only after the fugitive is informed of the
rights that he or she would surrender and that such waiver is
genuinely voluntary.-7 These treaties can be improved if they
had more detailed requirements about the need to waive before
a court abroad and for the "relator" to receive at the hearing a
full panoply of his or rights that will be waived. This would be
similar to a hearing that a defendant in a U.S. criminal case has
prior to the acceptance of his plea. The court, orally and on the
record, reviews in detail each and every right the defendant
foregoes when he or she agrees to a plea.
A major development has been the ability of the United
States to have Colombia and the Dominican Republic resume
extradition of nationals, although some observers believe the
long-term viability of criminal justice objectives, such as counter-
drug efforts resulting from extraditing nationals from these
countries, is in question.5"
Efforts by foreign governments to extradite individuals from
the United States have encountered difficulty in a number of
cases because U.S. courts, in examining the requests, have dis-
counted the evidence in support of the requests because of the
apparent due process violations and questionable evidence gath-
ering procedures that have occurred in the requesting state. 9
Behind requests based on evidence, creative and proactive at-
tacks on evidence from countries with questionable criminal
procedures, along with evidence of apparent violations in the
gathering of evidence in support of the extradition request, can
reap dividends.
57. See Bruce Zagaris & Danielle Ban-anca, U.S. Senate Considers Ratification of 38
U.S. Criminal Cooperation Treaties, 14 INT'L ENFORCEMENT L. REP. 404 (1998).
58. Joshua H. Warmund, Comment, Removing Drug Lords and Street Pushers: The
Extradition of Nationals in Colombia and the Dominican Republic 22 FoRDHAM INT'L L.J.
2373, 2378 (1999) (concluding that domestic political motivations that shaped new ex-
tradition reforms will adversely impact laws' effectiveness to combat drug trafficking).
59. Bruce Zagaris &Julia Padierna Peralta, Mexico-United States Extradition and Alter-
natives: From Fugitive Slaves to Drug Traffickers-150 Years and Beyond the Rio Grande's
Winding Courses, 12 AM. U.J. OF INT'L L. & POL'Y 521, 597-603 (1997) (discussing In the
Matter of the Extradition of Contreras, 800 F. Supp. 1462 (S.D. Tex. 1992)) and Ruiz-Mas-
sieu cases, e.g., Masseiu v. Reno, 915 F. Supp. 681 (D.N.J. 1996)).
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A controversial aspect of U.S. extradition jurisprudence and
practice has been its periodic use of abductions by force and
fraud as an alternative to extradition. In 1992, the U.S. Supreme
Court held that the U.S. government's arranged abduction of a
Mexican national from Mexican territory, despite the existence
of an extradition treaty, did not divest the court ofjurisdiction.6 0
The U.S. government partly justified its use of abduction be-
cause it was prosecuting an individual who allegedly participated
with a drug trafficking group in the abduction, torture, and mur-
der of a U.S. drug liaison official in Mexico. After the United
States abducted and detained the Mexican for close to two years,
the court dismissed the case for lack of evidence. The U.S. juris-
prudential practice, known as the Ker-Frisbie doctrine, stands for
the proposition that the illegality of the arrest and seizure of the
defendant by private or state actors does not preclude personal
jurisdiction over the defendants, absent cruel or outrageous
treatment.6 1 Despite protests by governments, international or-
ganizations,62 and resolutions adopted by non-governmental or-
ganizations63 that international law requires courts to refuse ju-
risdiction when a fugitive's custody results from abductions, the
U.S. practice has not changed although it appears mostly under
wraps. 64
While U.S. citizens usually assume that abductions only hap-
pen to foreigners, U.S. citizens are also victims of this practice.
An example of how U.S. businesspersons can encounter the
ever-penetrating force of extraterritorial jurisdiction is displayed
in the case of Gilbert Andrews, an El Paso businessman who was
60. United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 112 S. Ct. 2188, 119 L. Ed. 2d 441
(1992).
61. See Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436 (1886); Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519 (1952).
62. On August 15, 1992, the Inter-American juridical Committee unanimously rec-
ognized that the Alvarez-Machain decision violated general principles of international
law.
63. At its September 1994 Congress, the International Penal Law Association de-
termined that the U.S. abductions were "contrary to public international law... and
should be recognized as a bar to prosecution." For background, see XVth Congress of
International Penal Law Association Adopts Resolutions, 10 INr'L ENFORcEmENT L. REP. 838,
886-87 (1994).
64. See FBI Authority to Seize Suspects Abroad: Hearing Before the Subcommittee
on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 101st
Cong., 1st Sess. (1989). For a related discussion on the position of the Executive
Branch, see Marc Zaid, Classified 1989Justice Memorandum Opining President Has Authority
To Disregard International Law in Favor of U.S. Extraterritorial Law Enforcement Activities Is
Released to the Public, 9 INr'L ENFoRcEmNT L. REP. 60 (1993).
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a victim of abduction by fraud and spent eight months in ajail in
Mazatlan."5 In 1995, Mr. Andrews sold about forty-five used
items to the new Mazatlan Red Cross hospital. The medical
equipment ranged from operating tables to heart catheters,
wheel chairs, lamps, blood storage units, and industrial strength
washing machines. Andrews received payment of US$130,000
for the items. Mazatlan Red Cross officials inspected, approved,
and collected the items at his warehouses in El Paso and
Anthony, Texas, loaded them on an 18-wheeler, and took them
directly to Mazatlan.
Oses Cole-Isunza, chairman of the board of the Mazatlan
Red Cross, gave pre-trial testimony that the equipment was so
damaged on its arrival in Mazatlan that it was useless. In addi-
tion, many of the items were supposed to have been donated,
when in fact none of it was donated.6 Steve Dominguez, a for-
mer employee of Border to Border Medical Equipment, An-
drews's company who filed an affidavit in the case, stated that
the Mazatlan Red Cross officials were so anxious to have the
equipment that they did not take the precautions Andrews's
company recommended-namely properly packing it in crates
and taking a slightly longer route via Mexico Route 15, which
extends through Arizona down the west coast of Mexico because
the roads are in better condition and would better safeguard the
condition of the equipment. Instead, the Mazatlan Red Cross
representatives took the more difficult route, from Juirez to Du-
rango and across a steep grade. It is a winding curved road
called "Espinazo del Diablo" (the devil's spine) to Mazatlan.
Those roads are "bumpy and bad, full of potholes."67
According to Andrews, the American Red Cross in El Paso
presented a letter to the Mexican customs in Jud.rez, stating the
equipment would be donated to the Red Cross in Mazatlan. An-
drews's list of the equipment with prices was attached. Andrews
explained that the letter was only a formality so that the Red
Cross in Mazatlan, as a non-profit organization, would not have
to pay US$40,000 in import tariffs for the equipment. The re-
65. Ken Flynn, Mexico Frees El Pasoan Jailed in Mazatlan, EL PAso TIMES, Dec. 12,
1998, at Al.
66. Ken Flynn, ElPasoan Tries To Start His Life Over, EL PAso TiMES, Jan. 4, 1999, at
lB.
67. Ken Flynn, Family Man Claims He's Wrongly Accused, EL PASo TMEs, Sept. 1999,
at lB.
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quest for such a letter, to circumvent paying customs fees, came
from the Mazatlan Red Cross, written in English to Donald
Fredell and dated February 2, 1995. On February 10, 1995, the
El Paso Red Cross responded with a letter in Spanish signed by
Carmen Ruiz, which included Andrews's inventory of items be-
ing shipped to Mazatlan.
Andrews rejected an offer from Mazatlan officials to free
him if he pleaded guilty to a lesser charge and paid a fine.
Meanwhile, a press report stated that officials of the U.S. Consu-
late in Hermosillo visited Andrews at the prison. Requesting an-
onymity, a consulate spokesman said that by international treaty
U.S. diplomats cannot help U.S. citizens jailed in Mexico, or any-
where else in the world. The United States cannot intervene in a
foreign country's judicial system. The spokesman continued
that "[a] bout the only thing we can do is visit the U.S. citizens in
jail and make sure they're being treated fairly."6"
Although Andrews's counsel and family approached the
American Red Cross for help, on September 24, 1998, it rejected
the request by the national office to win Andrew's release. Ann
Stingle, spokeswoman for the Red Cross national office in Wash-
ington, D.C., said she sympathized with Andrews's plight, but it
was a matter between Mr. Andrews and the Mazatlan Red Cross.
The American Red Cross does not have the authority to extricate
him. Mitchell Moss, counsel for Andrews, underscored the role
the El Paso Red Cross played in the case when it wrote a letter
stating the hospital equipment the Mazatlan Red Cross obtained
from Andrews had been donated when in fact it had been
bought.69 Despite the refusal by the U.S. national Red Cross of-
fice to his request for help, the El Paso office of the American
Red Cross actively assisted Andrews in his case. Among other
things, the El Paso Red Cross apparently wrote a letter to Mexi-
can Judge Jacobo Ahumada Angulo, stating that the equipment
picked up in El Paso by Mazatlan officials in 1995 was not
donated, but purchased by the Mazatlan Red Cross from An-
drews for US$130,000.
On September 23, 1998, Jose Luis Posada, president of the
Mazatlan Bar Association, filed petitions, accusing the judge in
68. Id.
69. Ken Flynn, National Red Cross Won't Help Free Businessman from Mexican Jai, EL
PAso TimEs, Sept. 26, 1998, at lB.
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the case of violating Andrews's civil and procedural rights. U.S.
Representative Silvestre Reyes (D-Tx.), whose wife, Carolina, is a
member of the board of the El Paso Red Cross chapter, also co-
operated with Mr. Moss, Andrews's counsel, and the El Paso Red
Cross.70 It appears that the Mazatlan and Jufrez Red Cross of-
fices played an active role in the abduction by fraud or "luring"
of Andrews across the border. Andrews stated that the Ju6.rez
Red Cross inquired about a piece of used equipment. Andrews
was arrested in the Red Cross office inJufrez and taken immedi-
ately to Mazatlan, where he was detained ever since without
bond.7 In a letter Moss's counsel pointed out that the Mazatlan
officials in charge have asserted criminal charges of fraud against
Mr. Andrews, despite corresponding serial numbers between the
goods bought and the goods delivered.72 Although Andrews was
eventually found innocent of all charges, the Mazatlan Red Cross
appealed the decision. On December 12, a panel of Mexican
federal judges cleared Andrews of all fraud charges and ordered
his release.73
At the end of 1998, in addition to Mr. Andrews, three other
El Pasoans were reportedly held in Mexican jails on the border
and released after lengthy stays for lack of evidence. Gerardo
Urenda, 34, returned to El Paso in January 1998 after he spent a
year in a Guanajuato jail, along with a cousin and friend who
were misidentified as bank robber suspects. In 1997, business-
couple Larry and Patricia Haggard were released from a prison
in Puebla after fighting for two years to secure their freedom on
fraud charges. 74
While U.S. counsel in such cases can try to appeal before-
hand to the Office of International Affairs ("OIA"), Criminal Di-
vision, U.S. Department of Justice, to scrutinize such requests
and not execute them, such a plea is often not possible. In some
cases the OIA staff attorney may determine that he or she does
not have the time or the inclination to listen even to such a pro-
posed intervention, especially since its normal client is the for-
eign government with which the OIA staff attorney is often try-
ing to persuade to act on one of the U.S. requests. In many
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Flynn, supra note 65, at lB.
74. Id.
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cases, U.S. counsel will not learn of such a pending request until
after receipt of a criminal summons.
One way to try to counter foreign criminal processes is to
hire foreign local counsel at an early time. It takes time just to
find the most appropriate counsel. If counsel is needed in a ru-
ral province or an urban area outside of the capital, then it may
take many hours, and weeks, of due diligence to find the appro-
priate counsel. In a business dispute in Latin America the ap-
propriate counsel is often one of the best commercial law firms,
which then hires criminal counsel. Unlike U.S. law firms, many
Mexican lawyers practice solo and it is unusual for commercial
law firms to have an in-house criminal counsel. Hence, the U.S.
counsel must actually hire two lawyers. In addition, to develop
sufficient leverage with the Chamber of Commerce or political
officials, additional counsel may eventually be required.
III. PROACTIVE ASSISTANCE BY A FOREIGN
DEFENDANT'S GOVERNMENT
An important role can be, and sometimes is, played by the
government of the defendant's nationality. In this regard, it is
important for the arresting state to adhere strictly and promptly
to the requirement to give consular notification, whereby it noti-
fies the consul of the arrestee's nationality. Some governments
can be very helpful in immediately visiting the defendant, notify-
ing relatives, helping tend to urgent needs, overseeing adher-
ence to international human rights, and filing and following up
breaches.
In some cases, governments do not effectively protect the
rights of their nationals. A story in the U.S. media in 1997 raised
issues about potential violations of international human rights of
David Carmos, a U.S. national convicted in Mexico of possessing
the illegal drug, methamphetamine. Just as importantly, the
case raised issues of the potential lack of fulfillment by the U.S.
government with its statutory and regulatory responsibilities to
help U.S. citizens detained abroad.75
In October 1992, Carmos traveled to Brazil for a week of
missionary work as a bishop-at-large for the San Diego branch of
The Essenes, a Christian group. When he returned, Mexican
75. Molly Moore, An American's Nightmare in a MexicanJai WASH. Posr, Aug. 13,
1997, at Al.
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customs officials detained him with plastic bags containing a sus-
picious powder secreted inside a container of DuraCarb-a car-
bohydrate drink mix in powder form-and three other cans.
Although Carmos admits carrying the drink mix, he says he had
never seen the three other cans until Mexican customs agents
showed them to him several hours after his arrest. Mexican au-
thorities accused Carmos of carrying seven pounds of a sub-
stance than can be used to make a chemical precursor of the
drugs amphetamine or methamphetamine.
After his arrest, the U.S. Embassy in Mexico City gave
Carmos a list of attorneys. Each of them refused to handle a
drug case. Eventually the Mexican Government assigned
Carmos a series of court-appointed attorneys, whom Carmos de-
scribed as inept. In fact, Carmos did not even learn about his
trial until nearly one month after it ended inJanuary 1993. Dur-
ing his trial, Mexican officials changed the charges against him,
alleging that Carmos was not carrying a chemical component of
an illegal drug, but was carrying the drug methamphetamine it-
self. According to Mexican prosecutors, the new charges were
based on new and better laboratory tests on the substance he was
accused of carrying.
A. Attention to Irregularities
Carmos's ability to obtain attention for his case came from
his unique services rendered in prison that came to the attention
of human rights organizations and local Mexican journalists.
For years Carmos had developed acupuncture and chiropractic
techniques and had written health books. In the 1960s, he spent
four years teaching yoga and "health dynamics" at Boston Uni-
versity's Sargent College. In the years prior to his trip to Brazil,
Carmos researched and wrote two health books in San Diego. In
the Reclusorio Norte Prison, on the northern edge of Mexico
City, his work in treating aches, pains, migraines, impotence,
and other ailments resulted in a Mexican university asking him
to conduct training courses at the prison for its doctors. Eventu-
ally, human rights organizations and Mexican journalists started
examining his case.
Carmos began investigating the results of the tests Mexican
authorities performed on the substance he was accused of carry-
ing. Four experts in the United States and Mexico concluded
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that the tests either had been fabricated or were based on analy-
ses of a substance other than the one he was charged with pos-
sessing. According to the experts, eight documents submitted as
separate laboratory analyses were photocopies of one test result.
According to an internal U.S. Embassy memorandum dated
April 9, 1994, a chemist for the U.S. DEA found other irregulari-
ties:
Upon review of the sentencing documents, it does seem ex-
tremely odd that Carmos, who was detained and charged on
the basis of a suspicious powder, would have been charged
with possession of a substance [the chemical precursor] that
only exists in liquid form.
Although Carmos learned that the U.S. Embassy file contained
documents that could help him, Embassy officials required that
he request the documents under the Freedom of Information
Act. The U.S. Department of State took two years and four
months to respond to his request, releasing the documents in
late June 1997, and then only several days after the Washington
Post questioned the delay.
When reporters contacted embassy officials about Carmos's
case as late as 1996, the consul general and public affairs officers
warned them that Carmos had an association with an alleged
drug trafficker. Subsequently, however, they conceded they had
no evidence to support such an allegation.
B. Role of the U.S. Government
Under interrogation by the media, a U.S. Embassy official
said that Mr. Carmos was not treated worse than a Mexican na-
tional would have been treated for the same crime. Even though
U.S. government documents cited serious irregularities in
Carmos's case, U.S. officials made only one complaint to the
Mexican government on Carmos's behalf in the last five years-
that he did not obtain adequate interpreting help during the
appeals process.
The response of the U.S. government raises questions of the
role of the U.S. government to protect its nationals when they
are arrested abroad. Under 22 U.S.C. § 1732, the U.S. President
must act when it is brought to his attention that a U.S. national is
improperly detained. The State Department, however, takes a
narrow approach to this 1868 statute, even though it only codi-
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fies the right of a state to protect its nationals under public inter-
national law and, even though, administrative regulations re-
quire U.S. consular officers to use their "best efforts in protect-
ing the citizen's legal and human rights" and use a post's "own
creative approach to arrestee and prisoner services. '"76
Carmos has stated that Mexican authorities apparently pur-
sued his case, even after prosecutors detected irregularities, due
to pressure from the United States to toughen its prosecution of
drug offenders. Representative Moakley (D-Mass.) believes the
U.S. Embassy failed to help Carmos because it did not want to
embarrass Mexico or jeopardize drug enforcement diplomacy,
especially since the United States is always trying to press Mexico
to strengthen law enforcement of international drug trafficking.
CONCLUSION
Many of the same issues apply to other U.S. citizens and to
foreign nationals detained in the United States. These cases dis-
play the urgent need for a new architecture in the hemisphere
and the world for investigating, prosecuting, and adjudicating
criminal cases. Globalization enables criminals to operate in a
borderless world and challenges governments to develop mecha-
nisms and institutions that are both effective in combating
borderless crime and yet fair to all the persons involved, includ-
ing defendants.
In countries such as Bolivia, Ecuador, and St. Vincent the
criminal justice systems were already underfunded and unable to
cope with their workload. The demands that they aggressively
prosecute, convict, and give long sentences to drug traffickers,
predictably led to many unfortunate prosecutions, persons who
spent years in pre-trial detention, and many unfair results.
The inter-American and global systems do not have ade-
quate and effective mechanisms to protect international human
rights. Unfortunately, the United States has not ratified the
American Convention and, while it speaks about human rights,
its leadership in terms of ratifying and implementing the Con-
vention and adhering to its requirements is wanting.
As the region facilitates free trade and goods in which capi-
tal, ideas, and services move instantaneously, a need exists for
76. U.S. Dep't of State, Foreign Affairs Manual § 441 (1987).
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better mechanisms to create a permanent group, the Americas
Committee on Crime Problems, which should be based at the
Organization of American States. This committee should be
staffed with lawyers, criminal justice professionals, and diplomats
who spend all of their time every day on treaties, harmonization
of law, and common approaches to specific crimes. The region
is starting to develop such mechanisms and informal coopera-
tion through annual meetings of the ministers of justice and the
establishment of an inter-American justice study center.
In the meantime, transnational organized crime will con-
tinue to exploit the gaps. Cooperation will continue to be ad
hoc and driven by policies on certain crimes such as narcotics
trafficking. Creative advocacy and diplomacy will be needed. In
this connection, bar associations and lawyers can and should
continue to be proactive in identifying problems and proposing
solutions. Just as important, the media and legislators will need
to play active roles.
Meanwhile, because U.S. attorneys and legal professionals
are quite advanced in due diligence and preventing crime and
misconduct, they have advantages and opportunities to help ex-
port their services and mechanisms abroad. Hence, similar ap-
proaches to minimizing risks, mentioned in this Essay with re-
spect to traveling and working abroad, can be applied to interna-
tional money movement, transnational corruption, international
environmental law, common carriers involved in international
transportation, and so forth. As companies develop minimum
standards for doing business internationally, the role of lawyers
and legal professionals will be important in identifying and help-
ing solve issues. 7
77. Bruce Zagaris, International Criminal and Enforcement Cooperation in the Americas
in the Wake of Integration: A Post-NAFTA Transition Period Analysis with Special Attention to
Investing in Mexico, 3 Sw.J. OF L. & TRADE IN THE AMERICAS 1, 82-84 (1996).
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